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Abstract 
We present one of the first quantitative studies on auditory verbal experiences (“hearing 
voices”) and auditory verbal agency (inner speech, and specifically “talking to 
(imaginary) voices or characters”) in healthy participants across states of consciousness. 
Tools of quantitative linguistic analysis were used to measure participants’ implicit 
knowledge of auditory verbal experiences (VE) and auditory verbal agencies (VA), 
displayed in mentation reports from four different states. Analysis was conducted on a 
total of 569 mentation reports from rapid eye movement (REM) sleep, non-REM sleep, 
sleep onset, and waking. Physiology was controlled with the nightcap sleep–wake 
mentation monitoring system. Sleep-onset hallucinations, traditionally at the focus of 
scientific attention on auditory verbal hallucinations, showed the lowest degree of VE and 
VA, whereas REM sleep showed the highest degrees. Degrees of different linguistic-
pragmatic aspects of VE and VA likewise depend on the physiological states. The quantity 
and pragmatics of VE and VA are a function of the physiologically distinct state of 
consciousness in which they are conceived. 
 
1 Introduction 
We present one of the very first quantitative studies of auditory verbal experiences (VE) 
and auditory verbal agencies (VA) in healthy participants across physiology-monitored 
states of consciousness. VE describe the perception of (imaginary) voices in the absence 
of adequate external stimuli. VA describe inner speech as verbalized thought, which can 
involve talking to oneself, or to defined or undefined imaginary voices or characters. 
VE and VA, as expressed in mentation reports, can potentially be markers of auditory 
verbal hallucinations (AVHs), which have been proposed to be on the same continuum as 
inner speech (Harley, 1986, 2014; McGuire et al., 1996). The analysis of VE and VA may 
help the ongoing search for a cut-off point between healthy and clinical AVHs (Bick & 
Kinsbourne, 1987; Cho & Wu, 2013, 2014; Fernyhough, 2004; Jones & Fernyhough, 
2007a,b; McGuire et al., 1995; Moseley & Wilkinson, 2014; Seal, Aleman, & McGuire, 
2004). While it has recently been argued that as much as 10%–15% of the general 
population experience AVHs (Sommer et al., 2010), it is still being debated if AVHs in 
those individuals assessed as healthy differ in form and function from AVHs as they occur, 
for example, in connection with schizophrenia, or if they are to be placed on a continuum 
model of psychosis (Allardyce, Gaebel, Zielasek, & van Os, 2007; Badcock & Hugdahl, 
2012; Daalman et al., 2011; Van Os, Linscott, Myin-Germeys, Delespaul, & Krabbendam, 
2009). Much clinical research is devoted to the connection between AVHs and 
neuropsychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia (Ditman & Kuperberg, 2005; Larøi 
et al., 2012; Poulet et al., 2005; Vercammen et al., 2009). The current work seeks to 
contribute to this discussion (a) by presenting a linguistic tool devised to quantify VE and 
VA as indexed in the natural speech of mentation reports, and (b) by determining the 
healthy baselines of VE and VA across states of consciousness with a tool that can 
subsequently be used for clinical populations. 
The current research was inspired by the observation that brain areas associated with 
AVHs in patients with schizophrenia overlap with areas that have been shown to be 
hyperactivated in healthy rapid eye movement (REM) sleep: Mapping studies on patients 
with schizophrenia identify activity in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) as a neuronal 
correlate of AVHs, specifically Brodmann areas 24 and 32 (Lennox, Bert, Park, Jones, & 
Morris, 1999; Shergill, Brammer, Williams, Murray, & McGuire, 2000; Silbersweig et al., 
1995). Jones and Fernyhough (2007b) note that the activation of the right anterior 
cingulate gyrus is a potential factor of AVHs. Further, the ACC shows higher metabolic 
activity in REM sleep than in all other sleep stages (Buchsbaum, Hazlett, Wu, & Bunney, 
2001). The ACC has strong neuronal connections with the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC; Barbas, Ghashghaei, & Dombrowski, 1999). Contrary to the ACC, the DLPFC is 
hypoactive in REM—with all its known effects on cognition and cognitive control in REM 
dreaming (Hobson, 2009). An updated version of the activation-synthesis hypothesis on 
the neurobiology of dreaming addresses the ACC hyperactivation and DLPFC 
hypoactivation in REM sleep and attributes the occurrence of dream movement and 
emotion especially to ACC hyperactivation (Muzur, Pace-Schott, & Hobson, 2002). 
However, a correlation of ACC activation and VE and VA in REM sleep has yet to be 
proposed. 
So far, research on VE in healthy participants has mainly focused on partial wakefulness. 
Mavromatis (1988) notes from his research experience that AVHs in sleep onset can be 
of different pragmatic qualities, taking the form of neologisms, irrelevant and nonsense 
utterances, references to previously experienced spoken conversation, and statements to 
oneself, as well as the impression that one's name is being called. Jones, Fernyhough, and 
Larøi (2010) conducted a questionnaire-based study on AVHs in sleep onset with the goal 
of establishing a number of their phenomenological properties. Lewis-Hanna, Hunter, 
Farrow, Wilkinson, and Woodruff (2011) demonstrate that healthy individuals prone to 
auditory hallucinations during sleep onset exhibit increased cortical responses to 
external auditory stimuli in waking. 
Zadra, Nielsen, and Donderi (1998) propose that VE are reported in approximately 53% 
of all reports of nightly dreams, as conceived in home settings and without 
electroencephalographic measurements of the specific sleep phases. These findings 
roughly fit those of McCarley and Hoffmann (1981), who reported that auditory 
experiences occur in about 60% of all dreams. 
This study proposes that VE and VA in healthy humans are functions of spontaneous brain 
activity, occurring normally and regularly over the human circadian cycle. They form an 
integral part of human consciousness along with simulations of other modalities, such as 
visual, haptic, olfactory, and auditory non-verbal hallucinations. It remains to be seen if 
such regular VE and VA can be quantitatively, pragmatically, and functionally 
distinguished from AVHs as clinical symptoms. VA and VE are investigated across several 
states of consciousness. A linguistic tool was devised to quantify grammatical references 
to VE and VA in a database of mentation reports. 
Independent, blind native speaker judges were asked to rate reports from physiology-
monitored states of consciousness and to classify the identified instances of VE and VA 
with regard to their linguistic-pragmatic features. The classification of pragmatic features 
of VE and VA is partly based on the classification of AVHs devised by Jones et al. (2010), 
to promote comparability between their explicit (questionnaire) measurements and the 
current implicit method of quantitative linguistic report analysis. 
This study reports on VE and VA in physiology-monitored states of waking, sleep onset, 
REM sleep, and non-REM sleep. It is hypothesized that day-to-day VE and VA in healthy 
participants differ between physiological states in their quantity as well as in their 
linguistic-pragmatic quality: As similar regions within the ACC are as hyperactive during 
AVHs in patients with schizophrenia as they are in REM sleep, we hypothesize that REM 
sleep exhibits the highest quantity of VE and VA. REM sleep is thus expected to exhibit 
even more VE and VA than sleep onset, the state that is traditionally at the focus of 
research on AVHs. As REM sleep shows a unique pattern of local hypo- and 
hyperactivation (a re-activated ACC while the closely linked DLPFC remains silent), we 
predict changes in the quality of VE and VA between states. 
2 Method 
Quantitative linguistic analyses were conducted of participants’ mentation reports from 
different states of consciousness. This objective third-person method is expected to 
measure mental events as they become expressed in the natural language of the first-
person report (for further explanation see Speth, Frenzel, & Voss, 2013; Speth, Speth, & 
Harley, 2015; Speth & Speth, 2016; Speth et al., in press). This study investigates if reports 
on physiologically distinct states of consciousness (waking, sleep onset, non-REM sleep, 
and REM sleep) differ in their numbers of linguistic constructs that indicate VE and VA. 
Four independent native speaker raters (2 female, 2 male) were instructed to analyze a 
database of participants’ reports on mental activity across sleep and wake states. The 
report raters were blind in so far as they were not informed after which state of 
consciousness the individual reports had been conceived. 
2.1 Database description 
The report database consisted of a total of 563 reports from 16 healthy undergraduate 
students (19–26 years of age, 8 male, 8 female). Participants had provided informed 
consent and were paid for their participation in the study. After participants had 
completed a preliminary training protocol, they delivered dictated mentation reports 
from the waking state, sleep onset, non-REM sleep, and REM sleep on a minimum of 
14 days. 
Daytime mentation reports were obtained via pager notifications at four random times a 
day, within a time frame in which participants had stated they would be available. For 
daytime mentation reporting, participants were given the following standardized report-
eliciting questions: “When you are beeped, think back and try to remember what was 
going on in your mind the time prior to your being beeped (i.e., anywhere up to fifteen 
minutes before the beep). Where were you? Who else was there? What were you doing? 
What were you seeing, thinking, and feeling? What was happening around you?” The 
method of using offline reports from waking by asking participants to report on their 
mental events has been used in previous studies to maximize comparability between 
dream and waking reports (Ajilore, Stickgold, Rittenhouse, & Hobson, 1995; Cantero, 
Atienza, Stickgold, & Hobson, 2002; Fosse, Stickgold, & Hobson, 2001; Stickgold, Pace-
Schott, & Hobson, 1994). 
Nocturnal reports were collected using a home-based sleep monitoring system, the 
Nightcap, which has been shown to reliably distinguish REM from non-REM sleep by 
monitoring head movements and eyelid movements (Ajilore et al., 1995; Fosse et al., 
2001; Stickgold, Malia, Fosse, Propper, & Hobson, 2001; Yun, Obermeyer, & Benca, 1997). 
Instrumental awakenings were performed by means of a noise signal. For nocturnal 
mentation reporting, participants were given the following standardized report-eliciting 
questions: “When you awaken, think back and try to remember what was going on in your 
mind in the time prior to waking. Where did you think you were? Who else was there (i.e., 
in your dream)? What were you doing? What were you seeing, thinking, and feeling? What 
was happening around you?” 
All reports were collected via a dictation device and later transcribed and edited 
according to the technique of Antrobus (1983) by removing extraneous utterances (um, 
er, ah), rephrasings (“I was in my bedroom, in my bedroom at home”), and commentary 
(“I had actually had lunch with him yesterday, and we had talked about the same 
subject”). 
2.2 Quantitative linguistic analysis of mentation reports 
Specific linguistic references to VE and VA were quantified in the participants’ mentation 
reports. The linguistic tools used for the quantification are based on linguistic theta 
theory (Gruber, 2001; Reinhart, 2002; Reinhart & Siloni, 2005), and in a different version 
have been used to successfully link degrees of linguistic references to simulated motor 
activity in mentation reports with motor cortical activation of the respective state of 
consciousness (Speth et al., 2013, ). The tool of auditory verbal agency analysis was used 
to measure (a) inner speech (as initiated directly by the participants or indirectly by the 
virtual characters in their imagination). The tool of auditory verbal experience analysis 
was used to measure (b) the experience of (simulated) linguistic events by the 
participants, of perceiving voices in the absence of external acoustic stimuli. As argued 
previously, this method of quantitative linguistic analysis allows for relatively high 
qualitative and quantitative accuracy, high research objectivity, applicability, and 
efficiency (Speth et al., 2013, , 2016; Speth & Speth, 2016). 
2.2.1 Auditory verbal agency analysis 
In linguistic theta system theory, the initiator of an event takes on a specific thematic 
(theta) role within a sentence or phrase (Gruber, 2001; Reinhart, 2002; Reinhart & Siloni, 
2005). He or she is the agent who performs an action. In the phrase “Mimi throws a ball,” 
Mimi is the agent. The agent is defined through his or her relationship to the predicate of 
a phrase: He or she is performing the action described by the predicate. Mimi is the one 
who is doing something. The agent is described by a noun phrase, but the agent does not 
necessarily correlate with the grammatical subject. Consider the following phrases, 
where Mimi is the agent in both (i) and (ii), but the syntactic subject only in the active 
version (i).  
1. Mimi opens the box. 
2. The box is opened by Mimi. 
This study focuses on a special variety of agency: verbal agency. Verbal agency is defined 
as such agency that is related to speech acts. The verbal agent is the one who is doing the 
talking. The following phrases contain instances of (simulated) verbal agency as they 
occur in mentation reports:  
1. Talking to my teacher about wanting to live on campus. 
2. And he was like, yeah, let's go grab something to eat. 
3. And we were chatting about love, and the word love, and when you're allowed 
to use it. 
Each of the phrases (i), (ii), and (iii) contains instances of verbal agency. 
2.2.2 Auditory verbal experience analysis 
In addition to verbal agency, we examined verbal experience. In linguistic theta system 
theory, the experiencer of an event, state, or action takes on a specific thematic (theta) role 
within a sentence or phrase (Gruber, 2001; Reinhart, 2002; Reinhart & Siloni, 2005). The 
experiencer is the entity which receives sensory, cognitive, or emotional input from the 
event, state, or action described by the predicate, without acting or controlling that event, 
state, or action. In the phrase “Mimi feels sick,” Mimi is the experiencer. The experiencer 
is defined through his or her relationship to the state (described by the predicate). Mimi, 
however, does not control the one who is doing something. The experiencer is described 
by a noun phrase. Consider the following phrases:  
1. Mimi sees a ghost. 
2. The ghost is seen by Mimi. 
Mimi is the experiencer in both (i) and (ii). This study focuses on a special variety of 
experience: auditory verbal experience, as experienced by the participant and reported 
from the first-person point of view. Auditory verbal experience is defined as such instances 
of theta theory experience that are related to language events, states, or actions. The 
auditory verbal experiencer is the one who is hearing language. He or she receives 
acoustic sensory input from the event, state, or action described by the predicate in a 
phrase. In the context of mentation reports, these linguistic events cannot be attributed 
to an external stimulus, and therefore have a hallucinatory quality. The following phrases 
contain instances of verbal experience as they occur in the mentation reports:  
1. My girlfriend telling me that she had, had actually cheated on me twice last year 
and this is with one guy especially who I find really annoying […] 
2. Once again I was speaking to God. He was going to; I have a keen sort of impression 
that he's like speaking to me. 
3. I was just having a dream about … we were listening to a symphony and one of the 
people who was listening to the symphony agreed that the symphony would be … 
listening to … that therefore he was very paranoid and like wanted the symphony 
to be very, really loud. 
Each of the phrases (i), (ii), and (iii) contain instances of verbal agency. Examples (i) and 
(ii) each contain one instance of verbal agency and one instance of verbal experience. 
Example (iii) contains one instance of verbal experience that is experienced from the 
first-person (plural) point of view, and one instance of verbal experience that is 
experienced from the third-person (singular) point of view. 
2.3 Report rating instructions 
All raters were asked to judge all reports. Raters were given a hard copy of the reports 
and an instruction manual in which they were asked to identify instances of (simulated) 
verbal agency as well as verbal experience in the reports. The instruction manual 
contained the brief definitions of auditory verbal agency and auditory verbal experience 
that are given above. Raters were issued with an Excel rating table, in which they were 
asked to use one line for each VA instance, and one for each VE instance, always noting 
the number of the report in which they find that VA or VE instance in the “report” column. 
The rating table contained different columns in which raters were asked to further 
classify instances of VA and VE according to the definitions given in the instruction 
manual. This classification is partly based on the one devised by Jones et al. (2010) for 
AVHs in sleep onset, but it incorporates linguistic information on grammatical points of 
view as well as additional pragmatic information on the speech acts. Raters were asked 
to identify the verbal agent as the experimental subject reporting from the first-person 
point of view, or as imaginative agents reporting from the second- or third-person points 
of view. The respective (simulated) speech act connected to each agency or experiencer 
instance was classified as command/suggestion/advice, a question, as unspecified 
communication (“they were having a conversation”; “we were talking about things”), or 
other. Raters were also asked to judge the speech act adequacy in the imaginative context, 
as well as its pragmatics (“linguistically and acoustically comprehensible”; “psychological 
neologism”; “acoustically incomprehensible [“he said something I couldn't really hear”]). 
The speech act manner was judged by the raters as “nice,” “nasty,” “dominant,” “scary,” 
or “neutral.” Raters were also asked to determine the recipient, the theta role 
experiencer, of the speech act (“reporting subject/group including reporting subject,” 
“other imaginative characters excluding the reporting subject,” “unspecified/unclear”) 
and to note if the experiencer utters a reply. The manual further contained the 
instructions that repetitions be counted separately. For the phrase “we talked and talked 
and talked,” for example, raters should note three instances of verbal agency. Raters were 
informed that reports of subjective experience are often transcribed in a way that the 
original, natural speech is preserved. They would therefore encounter elliptical or 
grammatically ill-formed sentences, and there would be cases where they would be 
unsure about their rating decisions. Raters were asked to use their best judgment and 
decide how to deal with such particular phrases, as not all possible instances of verbal 
agency and experience possible in natural speech can be predefined. 
2.4 Statistical analyses 
Identified instances of VA or VE were aggregated for every report, separately for every 
rater. One-way analyses of variance (anovas) were conducted to test for differences in 
the number of instances of VA and the number of instances of VE per report between the 
four states of waking, sleep onset, non-REM, and REM. For post hoc analyses, Games–
Howell tests were conducted. 
A multivariate analysis of covariance (mancova) was conducted to analyze changes in the 
number of pragmatic characteristics of VA or VE across states. Pragmatic characteristics 
were assessed as follows: verbal agency/experience identification (disembodied voices, 
reporting subject, non-human character, specified person, unspecified person), verbal 
agency/experience perspective (first person singular, first person plural, third person 
singular, third person plural), speech act (command/suggestion/advice, unspecified, 
other), speech act adequacy (adequate, possibly random), speech act quality 
(linguistically/acoustically comprehensible, psychological neologism, 
incomprehensible), speech act manner (nice, nasty, dominant, scary, neutral), 
experiencer/speech act agent (reporting subject, other imaginative character, 
unspecified/unclear), and experiencer reply (subject replies, subject does not reply, 
other character replies). To analyze changes in the specific pattern of VA or VE and to 
clear these results from the overall effect that the number of VA or VE changes between 
states, the number of VA or VE per report served as a covariate. Post hoc, multiple 
analyses of covariance (ancova) and Fisher's least significant difference (LSD) tests were 
used. 
3 Results 
Reports from different states of consciousness were distributed as follows: A total of 164 
reports stemmed from waking, 150 from sleep onset, 115 from non-REM, and 134 from 
REM. On average, the four raters identified 136 instances of VA and 249.75 instances of 
VE in the 563 reports. Linguistic samples from reports collected from the different 
physiological states can be seen in Table 1. 
Table 1: Linguistic samples from reports conceived from waking, sleep onset, REM and 
non-REM sleep. Verbal agencies and experiences along with the grammatical perspective 
(first, second, third) from which they are reported are given, as well as the pragmatics.  
   
 sample Verbal agency/experience 
 
Waking 
 
 
 
singing that song in my head “…times are good or 
bad,” I don’t know I can’t remember the lyrics but I 
hate the song and it’s stuck in my head as I was also 
kind of saying to myself “Mavisto” which is the 
brand name of the jacket I have  
 
 
2 x verbal agency experienced by 
the first person singular, i. e. from 
the participant’s perspective also 
acting as verbal agent. Speech acts 
unspecified, speech act adequacies 
“possibly random”, speech act 
manners “neutral “.  
 
 
 
                                           
 
Sleep Onset  
 
 
 
Ah, same little God theme again. I was kind of 
hearing him speak to me or you know, making 
something up; I mean you can just have that, but I 
was just hearing “My child, my child.” It was kind of 
comforting.  
 
 
 
I was… there was a song going through my head 
that I’d been listening to earlier tonight by the 
Grateful Dead and I was just sort of you know 
mentally singing it. 
 
 
 
2 x verbal experience, experienced 
by the first person singular, with 
third person agent “disembodied 
voice”. Speech acts “other”, speech 
act adequacies “adequate”, speech 
act manners “nice”.  
 
1 x verbal agency, initiated by the 
first person singular. Speech act 
“other”, speech act adequacy 
“random”, speech act manner 
“neutral”.  
 
 1 x verbal agency, initiated by the 
first person singular. Speech act 
I was just thinking. Drip a dolly from the dock… 
about a little girl hanging over a dock dipping her 
dolly in trying to catch a fish […] and I kept 
repeating the drip a dolly from the dock. The 
sentence went over in my head. 
 
I had this image of a dog in my head. A dog with a 
bell around its neck that was ringing. 
 
“other”, speech act adequacy 
“random”, speech act manner 
“neutral”.              
 
N/A                             
 
non-REM 
 
people speaking in some sort of weird, stilted 
language, like something out of a movie 
 
 
 
 
there is a woman saying eye glasses, eye glasses 
with a case, were for girls and she called the case a 
crocker 
 
 
 
I was talking to my friend, Dave, don’t really know 
what we were talking about actually. But we were 
talking 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I was having a conversation with someone. The last 
thing I remember them saying was something like 
“Give it up. Let it go.” 
 
 
1 x verbal agency, initiated by the 
third person plural, i. e. 
imaginative characters. Speech act 
“unspecified communication”, 
speech act manner “neutral”. 
 
1 x verbal agency, initiated by the 
third person singular. Speech act 
“command/suggestion/advice”, 
speech act manner “neutral”. 
 
1 x verbal agency, initiated by the 
first person singular, with third 
person singular as experiencer, 
speech act manner “neutral”.  
1 x verbal agency, initiated by the 
first person plural, i. e. participant 
and imaginative (non-present) 
character; speech act “unspecified 
communication”, speech act 
manner “neutral”).  
 
1 x verbal agency, initiated by the 
first person singular, speech act 
“unspecified communication”, 
speech act manner “neutral.  
1 x verbal agency, initiated by the 
third person plural, with 
participant as experiencer; speech 
act “command/suggestion/advice”, 
speech act manner “neutral”. 
 
REM 
 
Uncle and Erin greeted me as “Senator.” “Hi, 
Senator, hi, Senator” and I was like okay whatever.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
one of singers; one of the parts, he said “Well my 
part is very; is wonderful” or something. And I said 
something to the effect of “Is it subtle or is it 
 
1 x verbal agency, initiated by the 
third person plural, with the first 
person as experiencer; speech act 
“other”, speech act adequacy 
“possibly random”, speech act 
manner “nice”. 
 
 
1 x verbal agency, initiated by the 
third person singular; speech act 
“other”, speech act manner 
something?” He said “What do you mean?” And I 
said “I don’t know.” 
 
“neutral”.  
1 x verbal agency, initiated by the 
first person singular, with the third 
person singular as experiencer; 
speech act “question”, speech act 
adequacy “possibly random”, 
speech act manner “neutral”.  
1 x verbal agency, initiated by the 
third person singular; speech act 
“question”, speech act manner 
“neutral”. 
1 x verbal agency, initiated by the 
first person singular, with the third 
person singular as experiencer; 
speech act “other”, speech act 
manner “neutral”.  
 
 
Cronbach's α for the agreement on the number of VA identified by the four raters was .91. 
For VE, the inter-rater agreement was Cronbach's α = .79. 
The prevalence of auditory VA and experiences differed significantly across the four 
physiological states of waking, sleep onset, non-REM, and REM sleep (VA: F(3, 562) = 16, 
p < .001, η² = .079; VE: F(3, 562) = 21.05, p < .001, η² = .102). For VA, post hoc analyses 
identified significant differences between waking (M = 0.6, SD = 0.93) and sleep onset 
(M = 0.11, SD = 0.35; p < .001), waking and REM (M = 1.04, SD = 1.7; p = .043), sleep onset 
and non-REM (M = 0.54, SD = 1.24; p = .002), and sleep onset and REM (p < .001). For VE, 
post hoc analyses identified significant differences between waking (M = 0.41, SD = 0.61) 
and sleep onset (M = 0.07, SD = 0.25; p < .001), waking and REM (M = 0.86, SD = 1.29; 
p = .001), sleep onset and non-REM (M = 0.49, SD = 0.96; p < .001), sleep onset and REM 
(p < .001), and non-REM and REM (p = .04); see Fig. 1. 
 
 Figure 1. Differences between auditory verbal agency across physiological states 
(waking, sleep onset, non-REM, REM), and differences between auditory verbal 
experience across physiological states. Error bars show standard error of the mean. 
Brackets indicate significant differences in VA and VE. *p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001. 
 
Table 2 shows the percentage of reports from waking, sleep onset, REM, and non-REM 
that showed one or more instances of verbal agency or verbal experience. A report was 
counted as holding VA or VE instances when at least two raters agreed on at least one 
occurrence. 
 
Table 2: Percentage of reports from waking, sleep onset, REM and non-REM sleep that 
showed one or more instances of verbal agency or verbal experience. 
 Waking Sleep Onset Non-REM REM 
Verbal Agency 35.4 % 7.3 % 29.6 %, 47.0 % 
Verbal 
Experience 
39.6 % 9.3 % 35.7 % 53.0 % 
  
3.1 Subdimensions of verbal agency and verbal experience 
A multivariate analysis of covariance that corrected for the overall number of VAs per 
state indicated an effect of the independent variable state on the dependent variables, the 
subdimensions of VA (Wilk's λ = .8, F(75, 1597.197) = 1.63, p = .001, partial η² = .071). 
For VE there was no significant effect (Wilk's λ = .88, F(69, 1604.5) = 1.09, p = .30). 
Univariate analyses of covariance (ancova) identified the relations between state and the 
subdimension of VA while correcting for the overall differences in the number of VA 
between the states. The significant relations are reported in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Differences in subdimensions of auditory verbal agency across the physiological 
states (waking, sleep onset, non-REM, REM). The probability values (p) and effect sizes 
(partial η²) of one-way ANCOVAs are reported. Below, p values of post hoc pairwise 
comparisons of Fisher's least significant difference test are given. State 1 – State 2 
indicates the size and direction of the significant difference between two states. 
  State 1 State 2 State 1 - 
State 2 
p Partial η² 
Verbal agent 
Reporting subject in his/her imagination   .005 .023 
waking non-REM .09 .007  
waking REM .11 .001   
Specified person    .005 .023 
waking sleep onset -.08 .021  
waking non-REM -.12 .003  
waking REM -.11 .003   
Unspecified person    .004 .023 
waking non-REM -.04 .014  
waking REM -.06 .001   
Disembodied voice    n.s.  
Non-human character    n.s.  
Agent perspective 
1st person   .027 .016 
waking  non-REM .08 .029  
waking REM .09 .005   
3rd person       .000 .035 
waking sleep onset -.09 .020  
waking non-REM -.15 .000  
waking REM -15 .000  
Speech act adequacy  
adequate    n.s.  
Possibly random    .021 .017 
waking sleep onset -.04 .033  
waking non-REM -.05 .005  
waking REM -.04 .026   
Speech act quality  
Acoustically comprehensible    n.s.  
Psychological neologism    n.s.  
Acoustically incomprehensible    .009 .021 
waking sleep onset -.02 .036  
waking REM -.03 .001   
Speech act manner 
Nice    n.s.  
Dominant    .003 .024 
waking non-REM -.08 .000  
sleep onset non-REM -.05 .026  
non-REM REM .04 .050  
Nasty    .024 .017 
waking REM -.04 .006  
sleep onset REM -.03 .022  
non-REM REM -.04 .013   
Scary    n.s.  
Neutral    n.s.  
Experiencer 
Reporting subject/ 
group including reporting subject  
   .040 .016 
waking non-REM -.08 .007  
sleep onset non-REM -.07 .029  
non-REM REM .07 .031   
Other character /excluding reporting subject    n.s.  
Unspecified/unclear     .001 .031 
waking REM -.08 .000  
sleep onset REM -.049 .021  
non-REM REM -.07 .002   
Experiencer reply 
Reporting subject/ 
group including reporting subject replies 
   .048 .015 
sleep onset REM .05 .048  
non-REM REM .08 .008   
Reporting subject does not reply    n.s.  
Other imaginative characters reply    .016 .018 
waking sleep onset -.05 .010  
waking non-REM -.05 .004  
 
 4 Discussion 
This study set out to investigate auditory verbal experiences and agencies across states 
of consciousness, aiming to compare the relative numbers of VE and VA in waking, sleep 
onset, REM sleep, and non-REM sleep. VE and VA were measured as linguistic instances 
of auditory verbal agency and experience of the participants, or (indirectly) of 
imaginative characters and disembodied voices in the participants’ imagination, as 
identifiable in mentation reports. 
4.1 Practicability and reliability 
The raters show excellent agreement in identifying the numbers of VA in the reports. 
Inter-rater agreement was lower for VE. The inter-rater reliability achieved by the raters 
in our study, without intense training or a psycholinguistic background, indicates that our 
tool of quantitative linguistic agency and experience analysis is an easy-to-apply, reliable 
tool to measure VE and VA as they are expressed in the language of mentation reports. 
4.2 Quantity of verbal experience and agency between 
physiological states 
The quantity of VE and VA is a function of the physiologically distinct state of 
consciousness in which they are conceived. Our comparison of reports from four 
physiologically distinct states of consciousness suggests that sleep onset hallucinations, 
traditionally at the focus of scientific attention on AVHs and related phenomena, showed 
the lowest number of VE and VA in comparison to the other three states. There are no 
differences in VE and VA between waking and non-REM. Rapid eye movement sleep 
exhibits a significantly higher degree of VE and VA than non-REM sleep, sleep-onset 
hallucinations, and waking mentation. Together with previous observations that REM 
sleep exhibits the highest level of bizarre mentation content (Mamelak & Hobson, 1989) 
as well as simulated (imaginative) motor movements (Speth et al., 2013, ), this finding 
preserves the “undisturbed […] association of REM sleep with a unique class of mental 
fantasy” (Foulkes, Spear, & Symonds, 1966, p. 280). Note that, although the criterion used 
was quite liberal, virtually no references to disembodied voices were found in our 
analysis of over 500 reports from healthy participants. 
Previous research estimates that auditory experiences occur in more than half of all 
nightly dreams (McCarley & Hoffmann, 1981; Zadra et al., 1998). The present results 
indicate that about half of all REM sleep reports show at least one instance of auditory 
verbal experience or agency in the form of VA (47%) or VE (53%). Non-REM sleep reports 
exhibit VA in 29.6%, and VE in 35.7% of all cases. In the light of the current results from 
a large database of reports from physiology-monitored states of consciousness, it can be 
assumed that earlier estimates of auditory experiences were made based on reports from 
specifically REM sleep, and that these auditory experiences were auditory verbal 
experiences. This study adds the insight that the number of auditory verbal experiences 
in non-REM is much lower. These results are consistent with earlier findings on agency 
in sleep onset and REM, in that REM sleep exhibits higher rates of both motor agency 
(Speth et al., 2013) and verbal agency than sleep onset. Note that the present results 
indicate that VE and VA occur most frequently in REM sleep. REM sleep dreaming has 
been compared with acute phases of psychosis/schizophrenia (Hobson, 1997, 2004, 
2009). Our findings thus appear to support the assumption that AVHs, and AVHs as they 
occur in states of psychosis, are indeed strongly related to inner speech (Jones & 
Fernyhough, 2007b). The results are further consistent with neurophysiological findings 
on ACC activation during AVHs in schizophrenia and during REM sleep (Buchsbaum et al., 
2001; Lennox et al., 1999; Muzur et al., 2002; Shergill et al., 2000; Silbersweig et al., 
1995). In that sense, VE and VA could be added as another variable to the 
psychophysiological activation-synthesis hypotheses of dreaming (Hobson & McCarley, 
1977). 
4.3 Quality of verbal experience and agency between physiological 
states 
Not only is the quantity, the absolute number of VA and VE instances, a function of 
physiological states, but so also is their quality. The subdimensions of VA analysis allow 
us to test differences in the qualitative, namely linguistic-pragmatic patterns, of VE and 
VA. Corrected for the primary effect that there are substantial differences in the number 
of VE and VA across the physiological states, VE and VA differ in their pragmatic form 
between states. 
4.3.1 Grammatical perspective 
In waking, the reporting subject takes on the role of verbal agent more often than in REM 
and non-REM, as represented by instances of grammatical agency in the respective 
reports. The verbal agent is more often a specified or unspecified person in REM and non-
REM. This is consistent with our result that the agent perspective is less often the 
grammatical first person in REM and non-REM than in waking, and more often the third 
person in sleep onset, non-REM, and REM. These two complimentary scales of VA thus 
both indicate a shift in perspective on auditory verbal events between states. This study 
thereby expands previous findings that identify dissociation, namely experiencing 
mentation from a third-person perspective, as a factor that distinguishes between reports 
of lucid and non-lucid dreams (Voss, Schermelleh-Engel, Windt, Frenzel, & Hobson, 
2013). This study investigated shifts in perspective, as a parameter of dissociation, on a 
larger scale, and using reports from physiologically controlled states of consciousness. 
This distinction further points toward a shift from inner speech as VA (perceived from a 
first-person point of view) in waking toward “hearing voices” (the phenomenon of 
auditory hallucinations uttered by an imaginary third person or disembodied voice, and 
perceived from a third-person point of view) in sleep. In a comparison between waking 
mentation reports from healthy participants versus those diagnosed with schizophrenia, 
this shift in perspective can thus be expected to mark an increase in what may be defined 
as AVHs in comparison to inner speech experienced by the participant as originating from 
his or her first-person perspective. 
4.3.2 Speech act adequacy and quality 
The adequacy of the speech act in relation to the described imaginative event and 
conversational situation was judged as less reduced in waking reports than in reports of 
all other states. Furthermore, the quality of the speech act was judged as more 
incomprehensible in sleep onset and REM sleep than in waking. These findings fit in with 
those of previous studies on the overall construct of bizarreness, which has repeatedly 
been found to be more prevalent in sleep than in waking mentation (Hobson, 2009; 
Sutton, Rittenhouse, Pace-Schott, Stickgold, & Hobson, 1994; Williams, Merritt, 
Rittenhouse, & Hobson, 1992). The reduction in speech act adequacy and quality is likely 
to result from the prefrontal inactivation during REM. Future studies on bizarreness in 
states of consciousness may thus benefit from the tools presented in this study, especially 
as the tools may prove more workable than earlier formal analysis of mentation reports. 
4.3.3 Speech act manner 
The manner of the speech act was assessed as more dominant for non-REM than for all 
other states. This adds to previously established characteristics of non-REM sleep, such 
as the thought-like quality of non-REM sleep mentation (Foulkes, 1967). 
In REM sleep, the manner of the speech acts was judged as “nastier” than in all other 
states. This characteristic of the manner of VE and VA in REM sleep fits in with the 
findings on negative social interactions simulated in REM sleep, as reported by 
McNamara, McLaren, Smith, Brown, and Stickgold (2005). 
4.3.4 Communicative situation 
The reporting person, or a group which includes the reporting person, is more often the 
recipient of simulated speech uttered by his or her imaginary characters in non-REM 
sleep than in all other states. The finding that the reporting subject tends to be the 
experiencer rather than the producer of simulated speech in non-REM is consistent with 
Foulkes’ (1967) characterization of non-REM consciousness as passive, thought-like 
mentation. 
In REM sleep, the recipient of simulated speech acts is more often unspecified than in all 
other states. The reporting subject, or a group including the reporting subject, also replies 
less often to simulated speech acts in REM sleep than in sleep onset and in non-REM sleep. 
In that sense, the present findings allow us to add another characteristic to the 
bizarreness scale for dreams and fantasies, which to date defines bizarreness through 
discontinuity, incongruity or uncertainty of place, action, characters, objects, time, 
emotions, or feelings (Williams et al., 1992), and which has been used to show that levels 
of bizarreness are highest in REM sleep (Hobson, 2009). It could thus be argued that the 
incongruity or uncertainty of (simulated) speech production and reception be added to 
future bizarreness scales. 
4.4 Limitations 
Our tool of analysis is deduced from established linguistic theories, has recently been 
validated in a modified version (Speth et al., 2013, ), and was found easy to apply by the 
raters. However, this study lacks information on the explicit opinion of the participants 
on whose mentation reports quantitative linguistic third-person analysis was conducted. 
A mixed-methods design, comprising both report collection and subsequent 
questionnaires, would allow for an immediate epistemological assessment of the 
discrepancies between explicit and implicit introspective knowledge. This study also 
lacks information on moderating factors such as substance abuse etc., which could 
influence quantity and quality of VE and VA as potential markers of AVHs and inner 
speech. It has to be said, however, that the Nightcap database has been cross-validated in 
a number of physiological as well as phenomenological studies (e.g., Atienza, Cantero, 
Stickgold, & Hobson, 2004; Cantero et al., 2002; Fosse et al., 2001). It further has to be 
noted that a stricter definition of AVHs would render results more comparable among 
studies, albeit it seems that such a definition can only progress along with our research 
and the tools of analysis. 
4.5 Implicit measurements of implicit introspective knowledge on 
AVHs and inner speech 
While Jones et al. (2010) chose questionnaires for their investigation of AVHs, the current 
study uses the method of quantitative linguistic report analysis to approach VE and VA as 
potential indicators of AVHs. We argue that questionnaires on mental events and report 
analyses measure two different constructs, namely our explicit opinion versus our implicit 
knowledge on mental events. 
In their online questionnaires, Jones et al. (2010) asked for what we must consider as the 
sleep onset equivalent of participants’ “general opinions about dreaming, reached 
independently of individual instances of dream recall” (Windt, 2013, p. 7). Our study, on 
the other hand, relies on our participants’ “knowing [of] the phenomenology of dreaming, 
where one refers to the knowledge of particular dreams, as they are remembered and 
reported upon awakening” (Windt, 2013, p. 7), or toward the end of other physiological 
states of consciousness. Windt (2013) warns of an equivocation of the two methods, 
considering it a crucial mistake that could explain much of the philosophical skepticism 
of the reliability of introspective insight regarding specifically dream reports 
(Schwitzgebel, 2011). Windt perceives the method of immediate collection of mentation 
reports under “ideal reporting conditions” as more reliable than questionnaires that ask 
for participants’ explicit opinion on aspects of dream phenomenology (Windt, 2013, p. 8; 
emphasis preserved). She remarks that Schwitzgebel's (2011) observations on (in that 
case) the changes in reported dream color, namely “the change from experience reports 
of predominately black-and-white to predominately colored dreaming in the 1960s,” may 
simply be explained by “a shift from questionnaire studies to studies relying on dream 
reports following REM sleep awakenings.” Our study seeks to approach the ideal 
reporting conditions demanded by Windt (2013) in so far as we use reports that were 
collected under experimental conditions. 
The differences in the trustworthiness of introspective insight (conceived as general 
opinions expressed in standardized questionnaires, versus via third-person analyses of 
mentation reports conceived immediately after a particular period of time) may, 
however, not depend on the circumstances of recall or reporting alone. We may have to 
attribute a great part of the diverging outcomes of questionnaire-based versus report-
based consciousness studies to the different methods of analysis for which the two forms 
of data collection protocols allow. The trustworthiness of participants’ implicit knowledge 
on mental events, quantified through implicit measurements of free mentation reports in 
the form of third-person linguistic analysis, may differ greatly from assessments of 
participants’ explicit introspective knowledge, as displayed in their answers to 
standardized phenomenology questionnaires. It will have to be discussed if the two 
methods should be considered comparable in the first place. Our implicit introspective 
knowledge may differ rather dramatically from our explicit introspective knowledge, 
especially when it comes to sleep onset mentation, recall of which we must expect to be 
generally poor. We can assume that a phenomenological questionnaire such as the one of 
Jones et al. (2010) on AVHs in sleep onset captures participants’ explicit opinions on 
exceptional and therefore memorable sleep onset AVHs that have occurred over the 
participants’ lifetime. Our database, albeit large, is limited to a number of average first-
person reports on states of consciousness in general. As the report collection procedure 
allowed for forced awakenings, our study should thereby have yielded information on 
participants’ recall of average sleep onset VE and VA as functions of spontaneous brain 
activity over the regular sleep waking cycle of humans. 
It is noted that the pragmatics and neurophysiological correlates of the internal auditory 
verbal perceptions of imaginative third-person utterances measured in the two studies 
may differ as a result of the different experimental methods. Participants may thus have 
reported memorable VA (originated by imaginary characters or disembodied voices) that 
differed from everyday VA and VE (originated and perceived “directly” by the subject) 
with regard to the perceived intensity, the attributed reliability and truth value of the 
hallucinatory experience, and the authority of the voice, as well as the perceived locus of 
the voice (“inside my head” versus “in reality”). 
If psychopathological AVHs are indeed such forms of inner speech that are not recognized 
as self-produced (Brunelin et al., 2006; Jones & Fernyhough, 2007a,b), then one way to 
analyze in how far inner speech and “hearing voices” are connected would be to use 
linguistic tools to compare mentation reports from states of spontaneous brain activity 
collected from healthy versus clinical populations. Shifts from simulated first-person 
utterances to those of simulated second and third persons could indicate that inner 
speech is no longer recognized as self-produced. It is further suggested that healthy 
versus pathological AVHs may differ with regard to their verbal versus preverbal status 
in the process of speech production (Harley, 2014) and near-simultaneous speech 
processing, as it must occur in the particular case of participants processing verbal 
utterances by imaginative third persons as psychological extensions of the reporting 
subject itself. 
5 Conclusion 
We conclude that the quantity and quality of auditory verbal experiences and agenices in 
healthy participants are functions of the distinct physiology of states of consciousness. 
The relative high quantity of VE and VA in REM sleep in comparison to waking, sleep-
onset, and non-REM sleep could be associated with its typically high activation of the ACC, 
while the inactivation of the DLPFC in REM sleep ties in with the changes in qualitative-
pragmatic characteristics of VE and VA. 
This study indicates that the objective, implicit third-person analysis of first-person 
mentation reports obtained under ideal reporting conditions (Windt, 2013) yields 
reliable information the spectrum of VE and VA as candidate markers for AVHs and inner 
speech. In spite of the significant differences found regarding quantity and quality of VE 
and VA across states of consciousness however, it has to be emphasized that reports from 
all four investigated states exhibited linguistic references to both. This observation 
should be seen as indicative of auditory verbal experiences and agencies as a universal 
characteristic of human consciousness. Humans seem to simulate verbal utterances and 
verbal perceptions across states of consciousness: In our heads, we talk to ourselves, to 
non-present or imaginary recipients, and we engage in auditory verbal simulations of 
perceiving verbal utterances, which may be replays or modifications of former real-life 
speech, or phonetic and semantic rehearsals for future conversations. 
While this study aimed to investigate VE and VA across normal states of consciousness 
conceived by healthy participants as opposed to those displaying symptoms of 
schizophrenia (World Health Organization, 1992), a future study should compare this 
healthy baseline against reports conceived by patients with acute schizophrenia across 
states of consciousness—which will present a bottom-up process of helping to find a 
tighter definition especially of quantity and quality of AVHs and inner speech in relation 
to their clinical implications: For some time now, hallucinations have generally been 
dismissed as error or disturbance, as an epiphenomenon of cognitive processes. We have 
only now begun to determine the form and frequency of AVHs across states of 
consciousness along with their inherent cognitive functions. We need these insights if we 
want to explore the connection between AVHs, inner speech, and other cognitive 
processes—including the role they play in connection with different psychopathological 
mechanisms such as in schizophrenia. We may be able to lay the groundwork for better 
clinical diagnoses and new forms of treatment. 
Future research may allow for a finer investigation of AVHs and their connection to inner 
speech not only with respect to specific psychopathologies, but in terms of their cognitive 
forms and functions, such as retrospective and prospective memory, planning processes, 
linguistic capacities and psychological mechanisms. At the same time, we will have to 
determine the precise physiological markers of VE and VA across states of consciousness, 
especially for sleep onset and non-REM sleep. Such psychophysiological integration 
(Hobson, 2009) will lead to a better understanding of human consciousness, and 
subsequently improve clinical diagnoses and treatments of different language disorders 
and psychopathologies. In the sense of a multiphenomenological approach to 
consciousness (Dennett, 2003), we suggest that if conducted with mixed-method designs, 
such research could also yield more insight on discrepancies between explicit 
and implicit introspective knowledge on one's own mental events, and its adequate 
measures. 
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